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Abstract: In this concluding article, grounded on the exemplary contributions 
contained in the preceding pages, the guest editors scale the proverbial soapbox and 
present a manifesto to guide the pursuit and advancement of the next generation of 
program theorizing. Formulating ten declarations for program theory development 
and examination, the modest hope of the authors is to motivate and inspire refl ec­
tive evaluation practitioners to broaden their views, approaches, and techniques for 
future program theorizing. 
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Résumé : Pour conclure, en s’insiprant des contributions exceptionnelles des articles 
précédents, les éditeurs de ce numéro spécial se lancent et soumettent un manifeste 
pour orienter la poursuite et l’avancement de la prochaine génération de théories de 
programmes. En formulant 10 propositions sur l’élaboration et l’analyse des théories 
de programmes, les auteurs entretiennent l’espoir de motiver et d’inspirer les évalu­
atrices et évaluateurs pour qu’ils élargissent leurs horizons, leurs approches et leurs 
techniques pour la théorisation future des interventions. 
Mots clés : analyse de contribution, manifeste, théorie d’intervention, élaboration de 
théories d’intervention, évaluation réaliste, évaluation fondée sur la théorie 
REFLECTIVE PRACTICE AND PROGRAM THEORIZING IN 
EVALUATION 
As stated in the Introduction, the overarching aim of this special issue is to pro­
mote reflective practice in program theorizing: to expand and strengthen both 
the conceptual and technical foundations of program theories in evaluation. Th is 
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emphasis on reflective practice emerges in part from a broader push in evaluation 
circles toward evaluative thinking ( Vo & Archibald, 2018 ). More specifi cally, the 
notion of reflective practice is rooted in the recent work by Th omas Schwandt 
(2015 ), who describes the reflective practitioner as someone who develops the 
knowledge and skills to design and implement methodologies in a variety of un­
familiar situations, has the capacity to comprehend local contexts, knows how to 
adapt methodological principles and practices accordingly, and has the ability to 
determine courses of action and move forward in a way that balances methodo­
logical, practical, and ethical considerations. 
As scholar-practitioners, we have over the past years collectively developed 
hundreds of program theories across a broad range of settings, geographical loca­
tions, and contexts, deploying a wide range of methods and approaches for devel­
oping and testing our program theories, experiencing both successes and failures. 
And as is true of most practitioners, we have learned through trial and error about 
what has worked (and what has not), allowing us over time to advance and refi ne 
our understanding and appreciation of real-world program theorizing. Our fi rst­
hand experience of how program theories unfold (and sometimes fold) in real-
world settings has in fundamental ways shaped our scholarly and practical work. 
As aspiring reflective practitioners, we have also come to realize that the 
methodological quality (however we choose to define it) of our theory-based 
evaluations was never the product or property of a specific design, data-collection 
method, analytic approach, or even specific features of our program theories, 
although we falsely assumed this to be the case on more than one occasion. In­
stead, we have come to realize that the  rigor more commonly resided or emerged 
from the analytical reasoning embedded in our program theorizing—the active 
interplay and integration of analytical competencies, technical know-how of 
methods and techniques, contextual and ethical awareness, and, perhaps of most 
importance, our integration of these in developing and verifying the program 
theories. As Van Melle, Gruppen, Holmboe, Flynn, Oandasan, and Frank (2017 , 
p. 752) declare, “it is all about rigor in thinking.” 
With these observations as our backdrop, the position we hold is that the 
notion of refl ective practice provides a worthwhile framework for the proposed 
pursuit of next-generation program theorizing. And with the notion of refl ective 
practice as our guide, we now turn to our program theory manifesto. 
A SOAPBOX MANIFESTO FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
PROGRAM THEORIZING 
From our viewpoint, striking changes are called for in program theorizing for 
it to rise to its potential. For far too long, program theorizing in evaluation has 
been characterized and depressed by linear, overly simplistic program depic­
tions (Coryn, Noakes, Westine, & Schröter, 2011;  Weiss, 1997 ). Th e all-too­
common mechanistic and perhaps ritualistic development of less than inspired 
program theories, followed by limited, if any, attention in subsequent program 
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implementation, has resulted in piles of half-implemented or even unused pro­
gram theories. Admittedly, we too have added pebbles to this pile. As such, and as 
theory-driven soapbox orators, we seek to preach our practice (and practice our 
preach) toward widening the range of strategies for improving the development 
and potential use of program theories. 
Toward these ends, the following 10 declarations collectively comprise what 
we take to be a “Program Th eory Manifesto”: 
1. Promote inclusion and representation 
2. Strengthen the linkage between evaluation and decision making 
3. Develop situated, contextualized, systems-oriented models 
4. Focus on program archetypes 
5. Explore different types of causal explanations 
6. Flip, stack, and layer program theories 
7. Put “theory” back into program theory 
8. Strengthen the testability of program theories 
9. Pursue theory-based synthesis and accumulation of knowledge 
10. Do more with less, more quickly
 These declarations represent what we take to be useful avenues to pursue in 
future program theorizing. They are grounded in, and inspired by, the impor­
tant work of other scholars and practitioners, informed by our experiences 
as practicing evaluators, and shaped by our ongoing exchanges on the topic 
of theory-based evaluation. The declarations range in scope and focus; some 
promote specific methods or techniques; some advocate for more fundamental 
perspectives on what program theories are, or even what program theories 
could or should be; yet others simply call attention to ideas or practices in the 
work of other theory-based practitioners and scholars that we fi nd inspiring. 
Underlying this diversity is a shared commitment to Schwandt’s ( 2015 , p.33) 
idea of evaluation practice as “actions informed by situated judgements.” As 
Schwandt suggests, 
[p]ractice decisions can be enlightened by conceptual or theoretical knowledge that 
serves as an aid in thinking through options in a situation that a practitioner faces. 
It is helpful to think of this kind of knowledge as a repertoire of principles, concepts, 
insights, and explanations that professional practitioners can use as heuristic tools 
“to think with.” 
We wholeheartedly agree. And in line with the above, it deserves to be said that 
the declarations are just that: aids in thinking about future program theorizing. 
Accordingly, these declarations are not to be viewed as off -the-shelf solutions 
or recipes to the many pesky pitfalls of program theorizing, nor do the declara­
tions collectively represent an exhaustive list of worthwhile practices to pursue. 
Rather, the declarations—individually and collectively—represent what we take 
to be improvements and advancements that are both grounded, yet innovative in 
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the context of current practice, as well as feasible and desirable avenues for future 
program theorizing. 
DECLARATION 1: PROMOTE INCLUSION AND 
REPRESENTATION 
We envision program theory as something that is only as valuable as when it is 
shared. This requires both the broad and targeted engagement of a diverse set of 
stakeholders at various junctures and levels throughout the development, imple­
mentation, reporting, and use of program theory. Indeed, calls have repeatedly 
been made for participatory approaches to theory-based evaluation (see  Hansen & 
Vedung, 2010 , on theory-based stakeholder evaluation; and Koleros & Mayne, this 
issue, on actor-based theories of change). This engagement requires the adoption 
of a pluralistic framework that is suffi  ciently fl exible to include conceptual, tech­
nical, and practical contributions from various stakeholders, including program 
beneficiaries as experts on their own experience, sources of expert input including 
academics from other sectors/disciplines, and the decision makers responsible 
for allocations of funding. Such engagement cuts to the core of refl ective practice. 
While we have learned a significant amount from those who have gone before us, 
the capacity for learning is unlimited; there is a potential contribution to be made 
by each stakeholder. Moving from stage to stage within a detailed theory of change 
from the level of inputs through to the ultimate outcomes without engaging others 
in the development, implementation, reporting, and use dimensions seems foolish. 
Opening both evaluators and the evaluation function to learning allows for 
the engagement of various diverse groups of stakeholders from a multitude of 
disciplines to collaboratively contribute to the articulation of how interventions 
are anticipated to work, and perhaps more importantly offer insight into why 
interventions do not work. This is not to say that all stakeholders need to be in­
volved at all stages or throughout all levels. Homework is required to determine 
which stakeholders can contribute most effectively at the various program-theory 
junctures. At various points in the process we should be asking the following 
questions: What would happen if a broader set of stakeholders were involved in 
the various stages and levels of program theory? Would we uncover key assump­
tions faster? Would we challenge our own assumptions more eff ectively? Would 
we waste fewer already scarce resources on implementation if the theory of im­
plementation was flawed and program beneficiaries could tell us this from day 
one? The recent coverage of Zimbardo’s debunked Stanford Prison Experiment 
( Reicher, Haslam, & Van Bavel, 2018 ), which was widely acclaimed in psychol­
ogy circles, demonstrates that the study’s impacts could have been much diff erent 
if only study researchers’ and participants’ views had been heard, recognized, 
and valued differently, much earlier. And the Stanford Prison Experiment is not 
unique in this regard. 
While it is useful to bring diverse viewpoints to bear on our theories, we 
should remind ourselves that the participation of diverse groups of stakeholders 
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does not automatically lead to the achievement of equitable outcomes. Equity 
concerns and eff orts need to be reflected in program theory in much more sys­
tematic ways to ensure transparency regarding inclusion/exclusion decisions, 
particularly in identifying relevant assumptions underlying and potential adverse 
consequences emerging from our evaluations. This involves providing space to 
ensure that multiple voices are represented. Rogers ( 2016 , p. 202) draws atten­
tion to the theory/equity deficit and outlines that “while theories of change are 
increasingly used in evaluation, they rarely address equity issues adequately.” With 
respect to Bledsoe’s (2005 ) contribution on using program theory in underserved 
communities, and more recent eff orts ( Bledsoe & Donaldson, 2015 ; Donaldson 
& Picciotto, 2016) that actively promote the role of program theory in equity 
discussions, encouragement is offered on the need for evaluators to step forward 
to explore what culturally responsive evaluation means in all facets and types of 
evaluation, ranging from program to policy. Evaluators are further encouraged 
to think about how all evaluation approaches are imbued with culture ( Bledsoe & 
Donaldson, p. 23). We can be more aware.
 While specific attention is paid to the engagement of stakeholders in devel­
oping impact theory, the implementation dimension of program theory is just as 
important as the alignment with systemic barriers to access and participation, as 
noted by Greene (2016 ). The relationship among program theory as an approach, 
participation, and equitable outcomes and valuation needs to be explored in 
greater detail. The intentional inclusion of elements affecting equitable outcomes, 
including gender (Whynot et al., this issue), needs to be explicitly incorporated 
into program theory. Incorporating reach into program theory is an early step 
in the right direction ( Mayne, 2015 ;  Montague & Porteous 2013 ). Conceptually, 
equity may be embedded in program theories as key components and expressed 
through the articulation of assumptions, but its representation is muted when 
it requires inferences to be made by readers. More can be done to situate equity 
issues explicitly in program theory. 
Promoting advancement in related areas requires building the capacity to 
learn more effectively from many in a program-theory - specific context; this 
also requires a mindset that supports hearing from others who have not perhaps 
been part of these discussions to date. Certain epistemological orientations and 
subsequent assignations of evaluator roles align themselves with greater facility. 
Regardless of paradigm, we advocate for a recognition of the dynamics related 
to power and influence in theorizing. These variables sway the value assigned to 
who is speaking and who is being heard. Program theory has jointly been held 
historically in two different sets of hands: those of the intervention and those of 
the evaluators. Enacting change to incorporate the collaboration of a broader set 
of stakeholders is not an easy undertaking, particularly working in silo bureau­
cracies that are heavily dependent upon processes and protocols to engage with 
other functions. The message regarding the value of engaging a diverse set of 
stakeholders needs to be clearly communicated by organizational leadership, and 
for that to happen there need to be related accountability mechanisms in place, 
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but furthermore, for sustainability, the value associated with broader engagement 
needs to be demonstrated. 
DECLARATION 2: STRENGTHEN THE LINKAGE BETWEEN 
EVALUATION AND DECISION MAKING 
We aim to strengthen the linkage between evaluation and decision making 
through program theorizing. The evaluation function in policy environments 
has historically failed to maximize its potential in contributing to decision mak­
ing (Leeuw, 1991). This is not a new challenge, but we are positing that program 
theory could be a potential solution. This challenge emerges in  Weiss’s (1998 ) 
critical work, where she notes that evaluation is one of many inputs in the gov­
ernance of public funds, summarizing that evaluation and research are used in 
a manner that could be characterized as indirect at best. Dobell and Zussman’s 
(1981) articulation of specific challenges encountered by the evaluation func­
tion include its misunderstanding by senior managers and program staff , tacit 
resistance by program managers, and the failure to consider the true nature and 
information needs of the user. These challenges, in addition to existing evalua­
tion policy requirements, the program level focus of evaluations, and the public 
nature of evaluation reports ( Bourgeois & Whynot, 2018 ), were additionally 
identifi ed as fi ndings that impeded strategic evaluation utilization by decision 
makers. The many disconnects between evaluation and decision making are 
relevant for discussion, as we suggest that program theory as envisioned in 
this issue could potentially provide one means by which to bridge the divide to 
evaluative thinking. 
How we identify our evaluand and how it interacts within its existing systems 
is a lost opportunity. Internationally, work on the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) reminds us of this. For example, gender equality not only is a standalone 
goal but is also woven amongst multiple other SDGs. These goals serve to remind 
us that policy makers are not dealing with simple problems but rather complex 
ones, and with what has been increasingly referred to as the “wicked policy prob­
lems” (Head, 2008;  McGrail, 2014 ). With cross-cutting issues facing decision 
makers worldwide in areas of concern such as climate change, these policy prob­
lems will not simplify themselves, nor will they disappear of their own volition. 
Complexity and wickedness necessarily involve a broader view of the landscape 
to address non-linearity and its potential paths, the inputs and infl uences of 
multiple actors, their associated technical and political considerations, and most 
importantly the “small shifts that may produce large differences in the outcomes 
of the systemic dynamics” ( Peters, 2017 , p. 386). With more sophisticated tax­
onomies evolving related to complexity and wickedness ( Alford & Head, 2017 ), 
we are suggesting that more sophisticated understandings of program theory can 
contribute to fostering evaluative thinking amongst decision makers. Ultimately, 
it is people who will reap the benefi ts or bear the burden of policy and decision 
makers getting theory “right.” 
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DECLARATION 3: DEVELOP SITUATED, CONTEXTUALIZED, 
SYSTEMS-ORIENTED MODELS 
Experience suggests that logic models that set out as stark box-and-wire dia­
grams with limited attention to narratives, explanations, and contexts can do 
more harm than good (Freer & Lemire, this issue). Without elaboration, these 
depictions become no more than desires or slogans in boxes subject to political 
“force fi tting.” 
Schwandt (2018, p. 131) importantly reminds us that as evaluators we can 
never “investigate something like a policy, program, practice or strategy in its 
totality—that is, in terms of all of its interconnections and relationships, and from 
all diff erent perspectives and viewpoints.” Rather, what we can do, and what we 
should always strive for, is to be transparent about how we select which aspects 
of our evaluand are highlighted and who is engaged in making these decisions. 
Building on this proposition, we would emphasize three elements as key to model 
improvement: 
1. theory situating; 
2. contextualizing; and 
3. systems orientation. 
Depictions of theory at the program, policy, or broader initiative level must be sit­
uated in terms of the level and focus for analysis and juxtaposed with other levels 
of theory. Theories can, and should, be contemplated at micro-, meso-, and meta­
levels. Much of the discussion in this volume has been at a meso-level, although 
actor-based theories as well as theories that situate and position girls’ and women’s 
experiences in STEM may touch on micro-theories to some extent. Lemire and 
Christie in this issue directly illustrate an approach to meta-modeling, potentially 
theorizing across multiple local program theories. The point is that diff erent levels 
of theory can work to support or detract from each other. For example, evaluators 
need to be cognizant of whether, and to what extent, a micro-theory about how to 
reduce individual drug-addiction harm is congruent with broader program theo­
ries of deterrence and remediation for drug addiction and, in turn, how these are 
consistent with meta-theories (e.g., can harm-reduction strategies and theories 
work within a broader strategy that amounts to a “war” on drugs?). 
Following the situating of theories, contextualizing is crucial. Th e notion 
of singular best practice should be eliminated. All practices need to be judged 
in context. The realist mantra of “what works (to what extent) for whom under 
what conditions and why?” can be a powerful means to recognize the inherent 
complexity in most human-based systems ( Pawson, 2006 ). It also ensures the con­
sideration of context as part of the performance story of any initiative. It should 
also encourage a fundamental focus on learning and improvement in addition to 
accountability and a normative assessment of value. Whether identifi ed as “fac­
tors,” “assumptions,” “pre-conditions,” or “risks,” good program theory should 
include contextual considerations. 
© 2019 CJPE 33.3, 414–433 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53070 
How We Model Matters 421 
Ultimately, a systems orientation needs to be fostered while avoiding 
hyper-complexity in description. Several articles in this special issue have, in 
addition to advocating for the adoption of a systems view, noted the value in 
recognizing key system elements such as the change theory and the action or 
implementation theory and strategy (e.g., Montague, this issue). The match or 
mismatch of these elements can explain a lot of observed performance. An­
other key element in systems is that they have actors. Koleros and Mayne (this 
issue) note the benefits of actor-based theories in the conduct of contribution 
analysis in complex settings. One could argue that such actor-based modeling 
can also help explain another key element of systems—the relationship and 
feedback loops that create virtuous and vicious circles, performance distor­
tions, as well as emergent outcomes and “bends” in implementation ( Pawson, 
2006). 
Finally, it deserves mention that another useful strategy may involve leaving 
room for ambiguity in certain aspects of the program theory ( Dahler-Larsen, 
2018 ). As Dahler-Larsen succinctly argues, there are concrete steps that evaluators 
can take to include and use specific types of ambiguity in their development and 
examination of program theories, including the use of what Dahler-Larsen refers 
to as “Janus Variables”—variables that work in two ways (p. 6). 
 The implications or impact of not getting program theory right may not be 
felt in the short term at the individual program level, but it will undoubtedly raise 
its implication head in years to come at broader policy, country, or global levels. 
The achievement of results is a shared responsibility that necessitates moving 
beyond the stakeholders that have been historically consulted in the course of 
evaluation activities. 
DECLARATION 4: FOCUS ON PROGRAM ARCHETYPES 
Evaluation has for the most part been fi xated on programs. How to think about 
and best portray programs is no trivial task. The problem is that program evalu­
ation as commonly practiced does not encourage a systematic approach to ac­
cumulating knowledge on programs. Evaluations are all too often narrow and 
“local” in scope. Th ey often miss obvious similarities in their impact pathways 
with other programs simply because the subject matter and clientele may be dif­
ferent. Moreover, program theories and logic models have often been developed 
from “scratch.” Realist evaluators like Pawson have noted that 
• 	 all programs are associated with some kind of theory or theories (they 
are theories incarnate); and 
• 	 there are as many unique programs as there are programs; however, there 
are only a limited number of program theories; therefore, 
•	 one can accumulate a good deal of diversified knowledge about the 
circumstances and success of program theories which can be of value to 
programs. 
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Program theories in turn can be classified by the nature of the program as 
policy instruments. As an example, take the  Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and  Vedung 
(1998 ) definitions of carrots, sticks, and sermons representing incentive, deter­
rent, and information programs. Each of these instruments has distinct results 
and delivery logic, characteristics, and recognized circumstances associated with 
success and failure. Funnell & Rogers (2011 ) propose that archetypal models 
can be built for these policy instruments, whereby refined categories can be 
established. For example, in the deterrence (stick) archetype, there might be 
subcategories such as summary conviction notices of variance-type actions, with 
little or no penalty. The relative success of such actions has been found to depend 
heavily on other contextual factors, such as the potential for shame (“reputational 
loss” is often a term used) with public exposure. It has also been associated with 
the understanding that more significant penalties can and will be used—thereby 
forming a deterrence period ( Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992 ). Other types of deter­
rents may more easily stand on their own. Over time, one can begin to glean from 
study, work, and experience the factors that recur in association with certain types 
of outcomes for a given mechanism. One can also consider the implementation 
and design characteristics that best fit a given policy instrument and its success 
characteristics. 
 The notion of archetypal program theories applies to both policy instruments 
and to action/implementation, including governance and delivery dimensions. Is 
the governance and/or delivery through a multi-government and multi-agency 
agreement? Unilateral delivery? Delivery with privately contracted elements? 
Delivery with voluntary or semi-voluntary third-party elements? Is the delivery 
mode hierarchical, matrix, or network-based? These are but a few key questions 
and factors that are important for understanding the complex effects that action 
theories and change theories can have on each other and as such demand our at­
tention. While the distinction of archetypes and correlational success factors may 
experience a few false starts, this orientation may just produce some profound 
insights. 
DECLARATION 5: EXPLORE DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS 
A central aim of theory-based evaluation is to explain how (or why) programs 
work (or fail to work). Despite this central role of causal explanation, there is 
limited attention to the different kinds of causal explanation potentially pursued 
in the context of theory-based evaluation. For instance, an important distinction 
could and should be made between  how or why a program brings about a desired 
outcome. Explaining  how a program works entails determining and describing 
the “active ingredients” that either individually or collectively elicit the desired 
outcome. These active ingredients are typically in the form of program activities 
or outputs that in diff erent confi gurations elicit a specifi c outcome. By identify­
ing and describing these critical ingredients, or (for lack of a better term) causal 
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recipes, theory-based evaluation offers important insights into how the program 
works. This is a configurational explanation for the outcomes. 
In marked distinction, explaining  why a program works entails determin­
ing and describing the program mechanism(s), that is, the underlying processes 
generating a specific outcome. This entails making explicit the individual or social 
psychological processes triggered by the program. By specifying these underly­
ing mechanisms, theory-based evaluation offers important insights into why the 
program works, why the program makes a difference for the participants. Th is is 
a mechanism-based explanation. 
 The position we hold is that these are fundamentally different types of expla­
nations, requiring different types of data and analysis, resulting in diff erent types 
of information, and potentially supporting different kinds of decision making. 
Accordingly, the type of explanation pursued should emerge from the type of 
informational need motivating the evaluation. As just one illustration, if the aim 
of the theory-based evaluation is to support future program design, a confi gu­
rational explanation focusing on how individual program components (or con­
figurations of these) lead to a desired outcome might be advantageous. Th is type 
of information will support the identification of specific program components 
(critical ingredients) that all things considered should be included in future pro­
grams. Conversely, if the aim of the theory-based evaluation is to understand the 
underlying reason(s) why program participants change their behavior (or fail to 
change) in response to the program, a mechanism-based explanation is perhaps 
more appropriate. Of course, we may also pursue understanding both how and 
why the program works (see Lemire & Christie, this issue).  
 There are of course several other types of explanations to be pursued in 
theory-based evaluation. To be sure, many situations might call for a combination 
of explanations, especially in layered program theories (see Koleros & Mayne, 
this issue). The point to be made here is that evaluators should be reflective of the 
types of causal explanations pursued and the type of information provided, and 
the extent to which these match the information needs motivating the evaluation. 
What makes something an explanation in theory-based evaluation? What makes 
one explanation better than another? What is the explanatory logic of these diff er­
ent types of explanation? And wherein lies the explanatory strength? These are but 
some of the fundamental questions that must be pursued if we are to better under­
stand and further advance the explanatory potential of theory-based evaluation. 
DECLARATION 6: FLIP, STACK, AND LAYER 
PROGRAM THEORIES 
How we model matters. Simply consider the marked difference between a pro­
gram modeled according to a simple logic model, an embedded program theory, 
or a Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) configuration. Each of these types of 
models depicts a markedly different representation and, in eff ect, understanding 
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Table 1: Common types of contributory relationships in program theories 
Model  Type  Explanation Description 
Simple 
causal model 
Simple 
causal pack­
age model 
Simple 
causal mech­
anism model 
 Complex 
causal model 
Embedded 
causal pack­
age model 
Embed­
ded causal 
mechanism 
model 
Embedded 
complex 
causal model 
 succes­
sionist 
 confi gura­
tional 
generative 
 confi g­
urational/ 
generative 
 contextual 
confi gura­
tional 
 contextual 
generative 
 contextual 
confi g­
urational/ 
generative 
A causal model depicting a contributory 
relationship between a program activity 
and one or more program outcomes 
A causal model depicting a contributory 
relationship between two or more pro­
gram activities and a program outcome 
A causal model depicting a contributory 
relationship between a program activity 
and one or more outcomes, specify­
ing the underlying mechanisms of the 
relationship 
A causal model depicting a contribu­
tory relationship two or more program 
activities and one or more outcomes, 
specifying the underlying mechanisms 
of the relationship 
A causal model depicting a contributory 
relationship between two or more pro­
gram activities and a program outcome, 
specifying the contextual conditions 
under which the relationship holds 
A causal model depicting a contributory 
relationship between a program activity 
and one or more outcomes, specify­
ing the underlying mechanisms of the 
relationship as well as the contextual 
conditions under which the relationship 
holds 
A causal model depicting a contribu­
tory relationship between two or more 
program activities and one or more 
outcomes, specifying the underlying 
mechanisms of the relationship as well 
as the contextual conditions under 
which the relationship holds 
A leads to C 
A plus B leads 
to C 
A leads to C 
because of D 
A plus B leads 
to C because 
of D 
A plus B leads 
to C, under 
condition E 
A leads to C 
because of D, 
under condi­
tion E 
A plus B leads 
to C because 
of D, under 
condition E. 
of the program being evaluated. Underlying all the creative labels for program 
theories, the position we hold is that practical applications of program theories typ­
ically involve seven fundamental (arche-)types of models, as described in  Table 1 . 
 The point to be made here is not that one type of model is inherently bet­
ter than another. What the table illustrates is that there is a broad array of types 
of relationships to be modeled as part of program theorizing—many diff erent 
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opportunities for modeling and understanding how and why programs work 
(or fail to work). Moreover, most program theories might advantageously use a 
variation of the above model types, using one type of model for some parts of the 
program theory and other types of models for other parts of the program theory, 
depending on the degree of specification called for (this type of diff erentiation is 
illustrated by Koleros & Mayne, this issue). 
In addition to these types of models, there is also a wide range of modelling 
techniques available to evaluators, including simple box-and-arrow diagrams, 
causal loop diagrams ( Williams & Hummelbrunner, 2011 ), and interconnected 
system of stock-and-flow diagrams ( Williams & Hummelbrunner ), or some fan­
ciful combination of these. Each of these modelling techniques would depict the 
underlying program logic in markedly different ways, promoting diff erent pro­
gram understandings and, in eff ect, result in dramatically diff erent insights and 
conclusions about how and in what way the program works (or fails to work). Th e 
different models off er different lenses through which we see the program. 
Accordingly, we need reflected conceptual and practical pluralism in how we 
model programs, whereby the use of different modelling techniques emerges from 
active refl ection and decision making in regard to the specifi c purpose and role 
of our program theories. To illustrate, we may, as Koleros and Mayne propose in 
this issue, use multiple layers in our models, using different types of modelling for 
each layer. One theory is then nested ( Mayne, 2015 ) in another theory of change 
within the same model. We may also use hybrid models by combining modelling 
techniques within the same theory of change (without layers). Yet other innova­
tive modelling techniques include “stacked” and even “3D” logic models ( Grim, 
Castillo, & O’Quinn, 2018 ). 
 The complexity in and surrounding social programs necessarily demands 
a broader range of modelling techniques. By broadening the range of models 
we employ in our program theorizing, we actively more away from the all-too­
common linear, one-way, overly simplified box-and-wire diagrams. We also move 
closer to the real-world complexity of social programs that are oft en characterized 
by feedback loops (balancing and reinforcing loops), reverse causality, causal 
interactions, asymmetrical causal relationships, contextual contingencies, and so 
on. The simple aim here is to reinvigorate our toolbox and practice by consider­
ing a broader range of modelling techniques when developing program theories, 
recognizing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each technique. We call for 
reflective practice in our modeling. 
DECLARATION 7: PUT “THEORY” BACK INTO 
PROGRAM THEORY 
We need to put the “theory” back into program theory. The potential role and 
value of social science theory is a persistent topic in theory-based evaluation 
discussions. Yet, despite sustained interest, both the extent to which and how 
evaluators use social science theory in their program theorizing is limited. Th e 
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selection of which social science theories also matters, as seen in the case of equity 
considerations (see Whynot et al., this issue). The position we hold is that social 
science theory, especially behavioral change theory, potentially serves well to 
inform and enhance our program theorizing. Inspired by Riemer and Bickman 
(2011 ), we strongly recommend a stronger push for “theory knitting,” that is, using 
“one or more social science theories as the conceptual grounding for both the de­
sign of the program and the program theory” ( Lemire, Christie, & Nielsen, 2019 ). 
 The idea of theory knitting is nothing new in the social sciences and can 
be traced back to work on theory development in psychology by Kalmar and 
Sternberg (1988 ). In the context of evaluation,  Leeuw and Donaldson (2015 ) have 
further promoted this linking of domain theories, theories on policy-making 
processes, and behavioral theories, offering a compelling example of theory knit­
ting in relation to producing public goods. In a forthcoming publication,  Lemire 
et al. (2019 ) review and showcase published examples of different types of theory 
knitting in theory-based evaluations. 
Indeed, the case for theory knitting is easily made. As noted by Mark, 
Donaldson, and Campbell (2011 ), the active and explicit use of social science 
theory promotes the specificity of key program-theory components, including 
purported mechanisms whereby the testability of the program theories is en­
hanced. On a similar note, Vaessen and Leeuw (2009) compellingly argue that 
using specific behavioral theories to substantiate and explain causal mechanisms 
can serve to enhance the internal validity of causal claims. Equally important, 
and in relation to external validity, the use of social science theory also supports 
the generalizability of these conclusions. As argued by Donaldson and Lipsey, the 
integration of social science theory and program theory “constitutes a (if not the) 
major way that evaluation contributes to social betterment by way of knowledge 
development” (cited in  Donaldson & Crano, 2011 , p. 145). We agree. 
DECLARATION 8: STRENGTHEN THE TESTABILITY OF 
PROGRAM THEORIES 
A central aim of theory-based evaluation is to establish what Mayne (2001 ) terms 
“plausible association” between a specific set of program components and out­
comes. As Mayne goes on to argue, this involves evidentiary confirmation of key 
elements of the program theory, examination of influencing factors, and disproof 
of alternative explanations (2001, p. 7). These are necessary steps in constructing 
credible contribution stories, regardless of the type of theory-based evaluation 
that is pursued.
 There are many potential ways to address this concern. One central stepping 
stone is to enhance program theory specification by developing more fi ne-grained 
descriptions of the most salient aspects of the program theory to be empirically 
examined ( Vaessen, 2016 ). As indicated in  Table 1 , different levels of model speci­
fication (granularity) can be pursued, ranging from simple models (depicting A 
leads to B) to more complex models (depicting A plus B leads to C because of D, 
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under condition E). The methodological point here is that specifying these aspects 
of a program theory with more precision enhances the evaluator’s ability to make 
predictions about confi rmatory/disconfirmatory patterns in the data, which in 
turn allows for more robust empirical verifications of the program theory. To aid 
in this empirical verification,  Mayne (2017 ) has developed and promoted theory-
robustness criteria that emphasize, first, overall understanding, structural logic 
and clarity, and alignment between activities and anticipated results, followed by 
specific result and assumption criteria. 
In logical extension of enhancing the specificity of program theories, another 
way to enhance the testability of program theories is by using structured analyti­
cal approaches and techniques.  Brousselle and Champagne (2011 ) have proposed 
logic analysis as an approach for using existing social science theory to examine 
the plausibility and validity of a program theory. Logic analysis critically examines 
“the program’s strengths and weaknesses, elucidates the links between the pro­
gram’s design and the production of desired outcomes, and identifi es contextual 
influences” ( Brousselle & Buregeya, 2018 , p. 156). 
Another strategy is to consider the strength of evidence in favor of one or 
more key elements of the program theory. For instance, by gauging the breadth of 
evidence in favor of the most salient components of the program theory, including 
the span of evidence across different data sources, methods, and implementation 
sites. There is a rich and broad literature on how to conduct quality assessment 
of qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods evidence, including operational 
frameworks to structure and guide such appraisals.  Lemire, Nielsen, and Dybdal 
(2012 ) have proposed the Relevant Explanation Finder, an operational framework 
promoting a more systematic and transparent assessment of rival explanations 
and influencing factors. The framework has been applied and further developed in 
a wide range of settings ( e.g., Biggs, Farrell, Lawrence, & Johnson, 2014 ). Th e use 
of the REF or other similar frameworks may serve to establish a stronger chain of 
evidence in support of plausible association and lend transparency and structure 
to the identification and examination of rival explanations and infl uencing factors, 
ultimately giving credibility to the causal conclusions drawn. 
Yet a third strategy is to pursue analytical approaches such as process trac­
ing, whereby more fine-grained causal mechanisms can be examined and verifi ed 
( Schmitt & Beach, 2015 ). A key strength of process tracing is that it relies on clear­
ly specified tests, whereby the presence or absence of hypothesized mechanisms 
can be determined. In this way, the method makes explicit the weight of evidence 
in favor or against the specific mechanisms, which in turn enhances the credibility 
of the conclusions drawn. In a similar vein, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, a 
case-based analytical approach, can also be partnered with program theorizing in 
identifying the causal conditions (e.g., specific program components) that either 
individually or collectively promote a specific outcome ( Befani, Ledermann, & 
Sager, 2007 ; Lemire & Christie, this issue). 
 There are of course many more structured analytical strategies and tech­
niques for both developing and empirically verifying program theories. By using 
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these structured analytical strategies, we ensure a more systematic and transparent 
approach to program theorizing, whereby the conclusiveness and credibility of 
our causal conclusions are enhanced. We strongly encourage more applied work 
on this topic. 
DECLARATION 9: PURSUE THEORY-BASED SYNTHESIS AND 
ACCUMULATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Taking stock of what we know is important for learning. Th e fi ndings included 
in this special issue suggest that there is an immense opportunity for cumulative 
learning at this time. The calls for archetypal program theories and theory knit­
ting are at least in part motivated by the opportunity to cumulatively learn from 
theory-based evaluations in ways not as of yet systematically or widely pursued 
in evaluation circles. As compared to the Cochrane Collaboration, for example, 
which might focus on addressing specific research questions using data from 
controlled trials and rigorously pre-screened statistical studies, the accumulation 
of evidence under this kind of effort would accept a wider range of studies but 
in turn would encourage transparency, discussion, and dialogue about both data 
and interpretations of theory. 
Over the past few years, there has also been a growing interest in mixed 
methods synthesis approaches, and, in logical extension, theory-based synthesis 
approaches. The most common approach, at least in evaluation circles, is that 
of Pawson’s realist synthesis approach ( Pawson, 2006 ). In the present special is­
sue, Lemire and Christie illustrate and promote meta-modeling, an alternative 
approach to developing program theories across existing evaluations (see also 
Lemire, 2017). 
Pursuing theory-based syntheses come with a number of benefits. For one, 
systematically combining the findings from a comprehensive pool of diverse 
studies provides robust information on the extent to which, and how, programs 
work across diff erent settings, populations, and times. Moreover, synthesizing a 
broader range of evidence—qualitative and quantitative—allows for answers to 
a broader range of questions, including “how” and “why” programs work (or fail 
to work). These types of questions are difficult to answer in traditional systematic 
reviews relying on meta-analysis of quantitative findings. For another, theory-
based synthesis approaches also hold potential to move beyond “a thin description 
of the evidence to produce higher order syntheses resulting in the production of 
new knowledge and/or theory” ( Pope, Mays, & Popay, 2007 , p. 6). Th e pursuit of 
“thicker” understanding of how and why programs work across diff erent settings, 
contexts, and times is in our view a worthwhile eff ort. 
 DECLARATION 10: DO MORE WITH LESS, MORE QUICKLY
 There is an iterativeness that has been associated with program theory’s de­
velopment, implementation, reporting, and use that has signifi cant resource 
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implications. These resources include capacity, time, and finances that are typical­
ly in short supply in most organizations, including various orders of government. 
These resource implications are highlighted in an era in which the evaluation 
function is pressured “to do more with less, and—do it more quickly, please” (we 
are Canadian after all). In the Canadian federal government, resources allocated 
to the evaluation function, including contracting dollars, and full-time equiva­
lents (FTEs) have been steadily declining over the last decade. Coupled with the 
former 2009  Policy on Evaluation’s requirement to address all direct program 
spending (DPS) with no new funding, and the recently implemented 2016 Policy 
on Results overhaul of the government’s results structure, this tension is very real 
and unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
Practically speaking, we suggest that there are several factors that will 
contribute to making program theory more efficient, including the following: 
(a) building program-theory capacity and competencies, including the resulting 
ability to scope appropriately, (b) the adoption of a longer-term perspective on 
behalf of decision makers, which features the accumulation of learning about what 
works, and (c) the demonstration of its value. Akin to the development of any 
other competency, we suggest that the more program theory is used, the better 
we will get at it. This applies at first at the individual level, and then within insti­
tutional settings based on principles forwarded in double- and triple-loop learn­
ing. Building competency, cumulatively learning from ourselves and others, and 
scoping where and how program theory may be employed most eff ectively should 
all result in a reduced resource burden by better targeting the expensive parts 
of evaluation—the data collection and analysis. By having strong theory-based 
knowledge about the key actors and critical influence points in our interventions, 
we can more efficiently target the people and resources required to understand 
how things are working. 
Additionally, the value of getting program theory and, accordingly, investing 
in its development, will ultimately serve as a more efficient use of government 
resources. It is our experience that organizations sometimes spend millions of 
dollars doing the wrong thing  by design. Investing resources up front to develop an 
understanding of key pre-conditions and factors that would allow a given design 
in a given context to work seems far superior to spending on patchwork fi xes and 
corrective actions downstream. 
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
A central aim of this issue is to promote reflective practice in program theorizing: 
to expand and strengthen both the conceptual and technical foundations of pro­
gram theories in evaluation. Grounded on the idea of reflective practice, we have 
proposed 10 declarations that in our perspective will serve to advance refl ective 
practice around the development, refinement, examination, and use of program 
theories. Ultimately, our manifesto and this issue as a whole both elaborate on 
Carol Weiss’s (1995) famous adage that when it comes to modern evaluation 
practice, there is truly nothing as practical as good theory. 
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